Dynamics of brain networks in aesthetic appreciation by Cela Conde, Camilo José et al.
Dynamics of brain networks in the
aesthetic appreciation
Camilo J. Cela-Condea,1, Juan García-Prietob, José J. Ramascoc, Claudio R. Mirassoc, Ricardo Bajob, Enric Munara,
Albert Flexasa, Francisco del-Pozob, and Fernando Maestúb
aEvocog Group, Instituto de Física Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos (IFISC), Universidad de las Islas Baleares y Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientíﬁcas, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain; bCentro de Tecnología Biomédica, Universidad Politécnica y Universidad Complutense, 28223 Madrid, Spain;
and cIFISC, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
Edited by John C. Avise, University of California, Irvine, CA, and approved April 3, 2013 (received for review February 13, 2013)
Neuroimage experiments have been essential for identifying active
brain networks. During cognitive tasks as in, e.g., aesthetic appre-
ciation, such networks include regions that belong to the default
mode network (DMN). Theoretically, DMN activity should be inter-
rupted during cognitive tasks demanding attention, as is the case for
aesthetic appreciation. Analyzing the functional connectivity dy-
namics along three temporalwindows and two conditions, beautiful
and not beautiful stimuli, here we report experimental support for
the hypothesis that aesthetic appreciation relies on the activation of
two different networks, an initial aesthetic network and a delayed
aesthetic network, engaged within distinct time frames. Activation
of the DMN might correspond mainly to the delayed aesthetic
network. We discuss adaptive and evolutionary explanations for
the relationships existing between the DMN and aesthetic networks
and offer unique inputs to debates on the mind/brain interaction.
Since the appearance of the ﬁrst neuroimaging articles onaesthetics (1–3), a considerable number of studies have
drawn a complex picture of the neural processes underlying
people’s aesthetic preference for visual and auditory stimuli.
Many brain regions seem to be relevant for aesthetic apprecia-
tion. However, three sets of regions are often reported in the
experimental results—those related to (i) reward/pleasure and
emotion, (ii) judgment/decision making, and (iii) perception (SI
Methods and Tables S1 and S2).
Most experiments have aimed at identifying brain regions
whose activity varies with the aesthetic experience. Some
studies, however, like Jacobsen et al. (4) and Vessel et al. (5),
have reported brain activity in terms of putative networks,
pointing to a network consisting of medial parts of frontal
cortex (FMC), precuneus (PCUN), and posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), among other regions. These interconnected
regions partly match the default mode network (DMN), cor-
responding to a baseline state of the human brain in awake but
resting conditions (resting state) (6).
Brain Connectivity Related to DMN
The argument that a brain network exists lies in the assumption
that some kind of connectivity exists between the areas involved.
Following Von der Malsburg and Schneider (7), connectivity is
associated with the presumable synchronization of neuronal as-
semblies—synchronous “ﬁring.” Distributed local networks of
neurons would, eventually, be transiently linked by reciprocal
dynamic connections (8).
“Functional connectivity” (9, 10) is deﬁned as the statistically
temporal dependency of neuronal activation patterns of anatom-
ically separated brain regions (11). To uncover such dependency,
temporal series of activation/deactivation of hypothetically syn-
chronized brain regions must be compared. Such temporal series
can be obtained, for instance, by detecting changes in blood oxy-
gen content (blood oxygen level dependent signals) (12)—due to
neural activity.
Raichle et al. (6), using positron emission tomography (PET),
were able to identify the DMN, subsequently conﬁrmed with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (13). Several
variables affect DMN activity, such as age, experience, and disease
(6). Despite this variability, resting-state studies using different
subjects, different methods, and different types of acquisition
protocols have consistently reported that the DMN consists at
least of the precuneus, medial frontal, inferior parietal, and medial
temporal areas (11). The breadth of the DMN has been extended
to include ventral anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral inferior pa-
rietal cortex, left inferolateral temporal cortex (14), and even the
hippocampus (14, 15).
Although, as we will see later, some relationships between
DMN and executive tasks—particularly involving working mem-
ory—exist, the activity of the DMN is curtailed when participants
perform attention-demanding, goal-directed activities (6, 13, 16).
Tasks asked by Jacobsen et al. (4) and Vessel et al. (5) of their
participants required cognitive processes that rely on attentional
resources. Consequently, the engagement of the DMN during
aesthetic appreciation seems surprising.
Processes Related to Aesthetic Appreciation
In neuroaesthetic experiments, the tasks usually required from
participants involve at least the processes of (i) viewing stimuli,
(ii) appreciating their aesthetic qualities, (iii) rating their value,
and (iv) formulating a response. These cognitive processes seem
not to occur simultaneously. By means of electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG), Jacobsen et al. reported that descriptive judgments
of symmetry are performed faster than evaluative appreciation
of their beauty (17). In turn, Locher et al., drawing from be-
havioral experiments and semantic judgments, interpreted that
perception of art “begins with the rapid generation of a gist re-
action followed by scrutiny of pictorial features” (ref. 18, p. 55).
Similarly, Winkielman and Cacioppo (19) held that beautiful
objects, at least, elicit positive emotions before subjects make
overt judgments. In a different domain, Haidt proposed the
existence in moral judgments of a quick, unconscious, and au-
tomatic evaluation (moral intuition), followed by a posterior
reasoning process in which subjects search for justiﬁcation of
their intuitive judgment (moral reasoning) (20). Although
Haidt’s model is grounded in behavioral experiments, this is
particularly interesting because several authors—including
Jacobsen et al. (4)—have posited the eventual existence of brain
mechanisms shared by aesthetic and moral judgments (21–24).
Thus, coincidence between moral and aesthetic brain networks
might occur.
This paper results from the Arthur M. Sackler Colloquium of the National Academy of
Sciences, “In the Light of Evolution VII: The Human Mental Machinery,” held January 10–
12, 2013, at the Arnold and Mabel Beckman Center of the National Academies of Sciences
and Engineering in Irvine, CA. The complete program and audio ﬁles of most presenta-
tions are available on the NAS Web site at www.nasonline.org/evolution_vii.
Author contributions: C.J.C.-C. designed research; C.J.C.-C., E.M., A.F., and F.M. performed
research; J.G.-P., J.J.R., C.R.M., R.B., F.D.P., and F.M. contributed new reagents/analytic
tools; C.J.C.-C., J.G.-P., J.J.R., C.R.M., R.B., E.M., A.F., F.D.P., and F.M. analyzed data; and C.J.C.-C.,
J.G.-P., J.J.R., C.R.M., and F.M. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: cjcela@atlas.com.es.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1302855110/-/DCSupplemental.
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1302855110 PNAS Early Edition | 1 of 8
Regarding aesthetic perception, the following null hypotheses
can be expressed:
i) An initial, general appraisal of the aesthetic qualities, consist-
ing of the perception of a visual stimulus as “beautiful” or
“not beautiful,” is performed very quickly. The neural corre-
lates of such aesthetic appreciation constitute a network. We
call this general process “aesthetic appreciation sensu stricto”
and the network it relies on the “initial aesthetic network.”
ii) Particular appraisals of detailed aspects of beauty, such as
gauging the extent to which the stimulus is moving, whether
it is interesting or original, how to rate it, the reasons for
considering it attractive, and so forth, are performed later.
We call these detailed processes “aesthetic appreciation sensu
lato.” Putative networks formed by the neural correlates of
such detailed aspects might be reduced to just one: the
“delayed aesthetic network.”
To which network would the DMN correspond: initial, delayed,
both, or none? To give an answer, it is necessary to empirically
determine the brain networks involved in aesthetic appreciation,
as well as the time frame in which they are active. Once this has
been clariﬁed, the possible coincidence between the DMN and
one or more aesthetic networks can be ascertained.
Experiment on Brain Connectivity During Aesthetic
Appreciation
Our null hypotheses refer to cognitive processes taking place in
a short timescale, compared with the relatively stable condition of
subjects’ brain activity during the resting state. Some studies have
focused on the dynamic changes in brain networks, using fMRI
(25), but, when the whole brain is considered, their time windows
cover several seconds. Therefore, to test our hypotheses we are
forced to use higher temporal-resolution techniques.
With a temporal resolution of milliseconds, magnetoencepha-
lography (MEG), which detects changes in the magnetic ﬁelds
generated by the postsynaptic activity of neurons, is one of such
techniques. By means of MEG, we have obtained temporal series
of brain activity for 24 participants during the resting state and
during aesthetic appreciation of visual stimuli. Four hundred stimuli
were successively projected and participants decided whether each
stimulus was beautiful or not beautiful (SI Methods).
The MEG signals were split into three time windows and two
evaluative conditions. Artifact-free time windows of 500 ms be-
fore stimuli projection were manually extracted for further
connectivity analysis, constituting time window (TW0). After
each stimulus onset, 1,500-ms artifact-free epochs were divided
into two additional time windows: TW1, 250–750 ms; and TW2,
1,000–1,500 ms (Fig. 1, Upper). The length of the windows was
determined by taking into account the time span in which brain
activity can reach frontal areas during aesthetic appreciation (3).
Before 250 ms, cognitive processes related to aesthetic appreci-
ation rely mostly on visual-processing occipital areas (26). In
turn, MEG signals corresponding to the participants’ stimuli
appreciation were grouped, constituting the beautiful and not
beautiful conditions.
Two different comparative strategies were carried out. Inter-
windows comparisons evaluated differences in connectivity be-
tween temporal windows along each condition (Fig. 1, Lower
Left). Interconditions comparisons evaluated differences in
connectivity between beautiful and not beautiful stimuli in each
temporal window (Fig. 1, Lower Right). We estimated the syn-
chronization of temporal series in the beta band by means of
Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient and phase locking value (PLV)
(27, 28) (for a justiﬁcation of the band selected see SI Methods,
Bands section; the PLV algorithm is also described in SI Meth-
ods). In all cases, P < 0.05.
Results
Our analyses measure phase synchronization and amplitude
correlation between time traces of activation of MEG sensors. In
our case, connectivity is expressed by a bounded [0–1] weight,
related to the amount of channel-wise synchronization. We infer
functional connectivity from these measures. Thus, “connectivity”
and “synchronization” can be taken here as equivalent concepts
from the point of view of brain communication, despite the lack
of information about the anatomical connectivity between neu-
ronal regions and their precise localization. Although correlation
takes into account the amplitude of a signal, phase synchroniza-
tion can be observed even in the absence of amplitude synchro-
nization (SI Methods).
Interwindows Analyses. Differences in synchronization appear in
Table 1 (for complete results, see Table S3).
TW0 vs. TW1. Compared with TW1, TW0 shows more synchro-
nized pairs of MEG sensors in both conditions (Table 1). The
higher TW0 connectivity extends contralaterally from anterior
occipital to anterior parietal, linking both hemispheres (Fig.
2, Upper).
In turn, TW1 > TW0 show similar numbers for both con-
ditions (Table 1), with the higher TW1 connectivity placed in
occipital regions (Fig. 2, Lower).
TW0 vs. TW2. Connectivity differences are fewer in TW0 > TW2
compared with the TW0 > TW1 case (Table 1 and Fig. S1,
Upper). TW2 > TW0 does not show any difference (Table 1
and Fig. S1, Lower).
TW1 vs. TW2. TW1 > TW2 connectivity is more apparent in the
not beautiful stimuli (Table 1). The higher TW1 synchro-
nization appears in occipital–parietal links under both con-
ditions. Moreover, in the not beautiful condition it extends from
the occipital and parietal to the orbitofrontal region (Fig. 3,
Upper Right).
TW2 > TW1 synchronization reveals the opposite trend: The
number of links and sensors that are more activated is higher
for the beautiful condition (Table 1). Also, the pattern of
synchronization differs. TW2 > TW1 bilaterally reveals higher
Fig. 1. Temporal windows, conditions, and com-
parative analyses used in our experiment.
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synchronization shared along parietal to temporal regions. In
the beautiful condition, it is more medially and frontally placed.
In the not beautiful condition, apart from being reduced, it is
more laterally placed (Fig. 3, Lower).
Interconditions Analyses.Differences in synchronization appear in
Table 2 (the complete results appear in Table S4).
TW0. Intercondition comparisons show minimal signiﬁcant dif-
ferences either in beautiful > not beautiful or in the opposite
case (Table 2 and Fig. S2).
TW1. Also, intercondition comparisons show minimal signiﬁcant
differences either in beautiful > not beautiful or in the opposite
case (Table 2 and Fig. S2).
TW2. In TW2, not beautiful > beautiful does not manifest dif-
ferences either. On the contrary, beautiful > not beautiful
analysis shows 19 sensors more connected (Table 2), with links
extending from occipital and parietal to frontal regions in the left
hemisphere (Fig. 4, Lower).
Discussion
If we compare interwindows and interconditions analyses, the
most conspicuous difference appears in the number of sensors
and links implied (Tables 1 and 2 and Figs. 3 and 4). Interwindows
differences affect extended networks in all cases, whereas inter-
conditions differences are few. This is an expected outcome.
Interwindows analyses refer to the dynamics of a cognitive pro-
cess, that of appreciating beauty, which, as our hypotheses hold,
may suffer considerable changes along the different time windows.
This means that distinct brain networks will be activated in each
case, leading to strong differences in connectivity. In turn, inter-
conditions analyses refer, in the same time window, to the process of
appreciation of beauty. Differences will appear only after reaching
its result, beautiful or not beautiful, implying subtle changes in
connectivity because most of the cognitive resources are the same
when an object is considered beautiful or not beautiful.
Resting-State Issue. Both recent experience and consolidated abil-
ities leave memory traces that affect the resting-state brain net-
works (15, 29). This is particularly important regarding the speciﬁc
conditions of TW0, taken as the resting state of our experiment.
Participants were quickly aware of the upcoming cognitive task to
be performed, on the grounds of their recent experience. More-
over, they were soon habituated to the task of judging the beauty of
stimuli. Thus, probably our participants had a TW0 network or-
ganization biased by the cognitive tasks to be developed.
However, our subjects could not anticipate the condition of
the incoming picture. Thus, TW0 synchronization should be
similar under beautiful and not beautiful stimuli. Interconditions
analysis for TW0 indicates this coincident synchronization (Ta-
ble 2). The few random differences that appear (Table 2) can be
attributed to statistical ﬂuctuations caused by the small number
of sampled individuals.
Fig. 2, Upper shows in sagittal view how TW0 is more con-
nected than TW1 mainly in occipital, temporal, and parietal
areas. In turn, interwindows TW0 > TW1 analysis manifests
a curtailing of the resting-state connectivity during TW1, af-
fecting both conditions (Table 1). As is well known, the DMN
fades when attentional tasks, such as seeing the projected stimuli,
are performed. Our results support this curtailing in TW1.
Brain network differences present in the TW0 to TW1 dy-
namics disappear when TW0 is compared with TW2 (Table 1).
Table 1. Number of sensors (S) and links (L) more synchronized
in the interwindows comparisons at P < 0.05
Beautiful Not beautiful
Windows S L S L
TW0 > TW1 117 1,012 98 695
TW1 > TW0 58 310 58 328
TW0 > TW2 13 8 23 15
TW2 > TW0 0 0 0 0
TW1 > TW2 51 282 63 389
TW2 > TW1 112 1,087 83 431
Fig. 2. Differences of synchronization between TW0 and TW1. (Left) Under
the beautiful condition (brain regions more connected before stimuli qual-
iﬁed as beautiful by participants). (Right) Under the not beautiful condition.
(Upper) TW0 > TW1 synchronization. (Lower) TW1 > TW0 synchronization.
Fig. 3. Synchronization in TW1 and TW2 under beautiful (Left) and not
beautiful (Right) conditions.
Cela-Conde et al. PNAS Early Edition | 3 of 8
This result indicates that the brain networks active during the
resting state and diminished in TW1 are somehow reestablished
in TW2. We will come back to this point when discussing the
delayed aesthetic network.
Twofold Model of Aesthetic Appreciation. TW1, compared with
TW2, shows a different pattern of synchronization under beau-
tiful and not beautiful conditions (Fig. 3). The results, thus,
support our hypothesis about the existence of distinct cognitive
events taking place at different time spans—what we call aes-
thetic appreciation sensu stricto and aesthetic appreciation sensu
lato processes. Identiﬁcation of such processes highlights the
existence of a dynamical structure embedded within the whole
episode of aesthetic appreciation. Also, a distinct network is related
to each process—initial aesthetic network/aesthetic appreciation
sensu stricto vs. delayed aesthetic network/aesthetic appreciation
sensu lato. This twofold model of aesthetic appreciation is prob-
ably the main achievement of our work.
Initial Aesthetic Network. Comparisons between TW0 and TW1
reﬂect, under both conditions of beauty, that the brain connec-
tivity present in the resting state is substituted during aesthetic
appreciation sensu stricto by a network that mainly connects occip-
ital regions: the initial aesthetic network. The task of identifying
cognitive processes related to these network dynamics is not
easy. Compared with TW2, TW1 synchronization is higher in the
not beautiful case (Table 1). It includes links extending from
occipital to frontal regions, particularly the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) (Fig. 3, Upper Right). The activation of OFC has been
related to not beautiful stimuli appreciation (30), so the lack of
frontal synchronization in the beautiful condition in the TW1 >
TW2 comparison may suggest that beautiful stimuli do not ac-
tivate OFC during TW1. However, this conclusion would lie in
a misunderstanding. As we have already mentioned, our analyses
are grounded in comparisons of connectivity, so equally syn-
chronized regions do not yield differences. An OFC equally
connected in TW1 and TW2 will not appear in the comparison
between these windows. To check the eventually distinct degree
of synchronization in OFC—or any other area—before beautiful
vs. not beautiful stimuli we must use the interconditions analysis.
Interconditions analyses of synchronization during TW1 give
almost no signiﬁcant difference between beautiful and not-
beautiful stimuli (Fig. 4, Upper). This means that, during TW1,
all brain regions reached by our analysis—OFC among them—
would be equally synchronized in both conditions. TW1 > TW2
connectivity in frontal regions for the not beautiful condition
must, then, be grounded on a curtailing during TW2. We can
state that the aesthetic appreciation sensu stricto (that one cor-
responding to TW1) implies common, shared cognitive processes
regardless of the stimuli beauty or lack of it, giving OFC an
important role in the initial aesthetic network.
The activation of OFC has been consistently related to reward
and punishment (31–33). It processes information about the
identity and reward value, associating visual stimuli to taste and
touch primary reinforcers (34). However, our concerns refer to
its linking paths. OFC, medial prefrontal, and the central nucleus
of the amygdala form part of the central autonomic network,
which controls appetitive (approach) and aversive (withdraw)
behavior (35). Primate OFC receives information about the sight
of objects from the temporal lobe cortical visual areas, contrib-
uting to stimulus-reinforcement association learning (34, 36–38).
As Elliott et al. (39) stated, the OFC is likely to be activated
when the problem of “what to do” before a visual stimulus is best
solved by taking into account the likely reward value rather than
its identity or location.
Emotional mechanisms related to OFC activation, such as
those identiﬁed in many neuroaesthetics experiments, could also
contribute to the increase of attentional resources, having an
important role in decision making (31, 38, 40). Brown et al. (41)
have pointed out that aesthetic pleasure is an object-related
emotion, thus leading to pleasure and repulsion, whereas out-
come-related emotion leads to happiness and disappointment.
Visual stimuli, such as those normally used in neuroaesthetics,
would be examples of “objects”, whereas actions used in neu-
roethics—see Greene et al. (42), for instance—would constitute
“outcomes”. Appraisal of objects is strongly associated with OFC
(40), something that is consistent with the idea that this region is
“a form of higher-level sensory cortex receiving input from ‘what’
sensory pathways involved in object processing” (ref. 41, p. 251).
Assessment of beauty seems to appear in the dynamic transit
from TW1 to TW2, because later latencies manifest—as we will
immediately see—differences in synchronization depending on
the putative previous results of beauty appreciation. The initial
aesthetic network is visible during early latencies (250–750 ms).
If this early process follows a parallel with Haidt’s moral intuition,
it would be performed automatically, in an unconscious manner,
although easily accessible to consciousness.
Delayed Aesthetic Network. TW2 > TW1 connectivity is reﬂected
by the pattern and number of sensors/links synchronized under
the beautiful and not beautiful conditions, showing important
differences between each case (Table 1). The scope and meaning
of these differences are better understood by means of the
interconditions analyses for TW2. Table 2 and Fig. 4, Lower
show TW2 beautiful > not beautiful connectivity. The inverse
Table 2. Number of sensors and links more synchronized in the





Windows Sensors Links Sensors Links
TW0 6 3 0 0
TW1 2 1 0 0
TW2 19 10 0 0
Fig. 4. Intercondition differences in synchronization at TW1 and TW2. (Left)
Higher synchronization for the beautiful condition. (Right) Higher synchro-
nization for the not beautiful condition.
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not beautiful > beautiful synchronization gives no result (Table
2). Moreover, it does not appear at any level of signiﬁcance
between P < 0.01 and P < 0.1 (Fig. S3). These results support our
second hypothesis of existence of a delayed aesthetic network
that is active only during the aesthetic appreciation sensu lato of
beautiful stimuli. Fig. 5 shows the delayed aesthetic network
under different perspectives.
The delayed aesthetic network consists of synchronized activity
mainly present along left regions. Medial occipital, lateral occip-
ital, lateral posterior parietal, medial parietal, medial frontal, and
prefrontal in the left hemisphere are linked in it. It is important to
underline that (i) we are focusing on MEG sensors connectivity,
and (ii) just sensors more synchronized in the beautiful condition,
compared with the not beautiful one, are identiﬁed.
Keeping in mind these limitations, relationships between the
delayed aesthetic network and regions previously reported as
active during the aesthetic appreciation can be stated. Many
examples of activation in frontal, parietal, and occipital regions
exist (Table S1). However, few studies on functional connectivity
during aesthetic appreciation have been carried out, thus far.
Brown et al. (ref. 41, p. 256) proposed a model of aesthetic
processing consisting of “interaction between interoceptive and
exteroceptive processing via recurrent connectivity between an-
terior insula and OFC,” pointing out that this circuit “is in no
way restricted to aesthetic processing, but may be related to all
cognitive processes that involve viscerality [. . .] We propose that
recurrent connectivity between the anterior insula and the OFC
can mediate [. . .] the assignment of valence to objects.” Thus,
Brown et al.’s model would better correspond to the initial
aesthetic network, where, incidentally, as we have seen, OFC has
an important role. Similar patterns of functional connectivity
along the reward circuit were offered by Tsukiura and Cabeza
(22), Lacey et al. (43), and Faivre et al. (44). Lacking more ac-
curate dynamic studies, all these works seem to cover aesthetic
appreciation sensu stricto processes, in which resting-state syn-
chronization is greatly diminished. What happens with the pu-
tative coincidence of the DMN with aesthetic networks?
DMN Role in Aesthetic Appreciation. As we have seen, the dynamic
scenario during the aesthetic appreciation implies a late re-
covering, during TW2, of the TW0 brain synchronization. The
DMN would thus coincide with some of the networks active
during this late episode.
Under TW2 > TW1 comparison, beautiful and not beautiful
conditions share a bilateral synchronization linking lateral regions
along frontal–parietal–temporal–occipital areas (Fig. 3, Lower).
In turn, the differences of synchronization in favor of beautiful
stimuli seem to affect mainly medial parts of the brain. These
differences are better shown in the TW2 intercondition analysis
(Figs. 4, Lower and 5). On the basis of the combined inter-
conditions and interwindows analyses, it seems that, despite the
moderate spatial accuracy ofMEG signals at the sensors level, the
delayed aesthetic network matches frontal, parietal, and temporal
medial parts belonging to the DMN (Figs. 3 and 4). Moreover,
this coincidence takes place only in TW2, and only under the
beautiful condition. Fig. 6 shows in different perspectives more
synchronized networks in TW2 vs. TW1 for each condition.
An intriguing question affects the recovering of part of the
TW0 connectivity during TW2 when not beautiful stimuli are
involved. As we have mentioned, in TW2 > TW1 comparison
both conditions share a higher synchronization that is bilaterally
expressed along temporal–parietal–occipital links (Fig. 3, Lower).
This pattern matches the similar bilateral synchronization during
TW0 (Fig. 2, Upper). These TW0 and TW2 highly connected
regions, due to their lateral position, should have scarce relation-
ship with the medially placed DMN.
According to He et al. (45), during the resting state the brain
functional network consists not only of the DMN. Also, four other
modules are active. Among them, module III mainly includes
lateral parts of frontal and parietal regions, being involved in
attention processing (45).
Two different networks related to attention have been in-
dicated as relevant to guide conduct before stimuli of special
importance. A dorsal frontoparietal network in the right hemi-
sphere maintains endogenous signals based on expectation of
seeing an object at a particular location, linking relevant stimuli to
responses (46). A second system, the ventral frontoparietal net-
work, responds along with the dorsal network when behaviorally
relevant objects or targets are detected. This second network
disappears when attention is focused, to prevent distraction, but is
reactivated during reorienting events such as those needed by the
unexpected appearance of objects (46). These kinds of tasks, also
engaged in aesthetic appreciation, would be responsible for the
activation of a putative reorienting network during TW2, shared
by both beautiful and not beautiful conditions (Fig. 7). However,
due to the lack of spatial accuracy of MEG at the sensor level, its
coincidence with He et al.’s (45) module III is tentative.
Activation of theDMNhas been proposed to occur duringmoral
decision making (47–49), thus supporting the existence of brain
mechanisms shared between moral and aesthetic appreciation
sensu stricto. These common resources would strengthen the links
between our hypotheses and Haidt’s model of moral processes
(20). Early episodes (moral judgment and aesthetic appreciation
sensu stricto) do seem to have common features. However, the later
moral reasoning, with its role as a self-justifying device, differs from
our delayed aesthetic appreciation sensu lato. The latter seems to
be quicker, not having any justiﬁcatory purpose. In actual fact, to
decide to what point brain networks active during moral reasoning
and aesthetic appreciation sensu lato are equivalent we would need
to get both brain connectivity and its dynamics in moral judgment
processes. Although some results on the presence of brain
Fig. 5. Delayed aesthetic network in the inter-
condition (TW2, beautiful > not beautiful) analysis.
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networks during moral reasoning exist (50), their dynamic anal-
yses are currently lacking.
Adaptive Issues. It is well established that the brain is a metabolically
expensive organ. In the awake resting state, the brain consumes
20% of the total oxygen in the body, despite that it represents only
2% of body weight (51). To explain evolutionary changes in the
brain, costs/beneﬁts ratios should be clariﬁed (52). Thus, the
adaptive advantages of any brain activity must be explained. What
might the adaptive value of aesthetic appreciation be?
It has been held that aesthetics could be just an exaptation
(53). Focusing on positive-valence aesthetic appraisals, Brown
et al. (ref. 41, p. 257) argued that “[aesthetic processing] evolved
ﬁrst for the appraisal of objects of survival advantage, such as
food sources, and was later co-opted in humans for the expe-
rience of artworks for the satisfaction of social needs.” Obvi-
ously, this hypothesis is difﬁcult to test—although it seems
reasonably sound when trying to relate aesthetic appreciation to
the adaptive advantages of emotions. However, the way in which
this exaptation occurred still remains unexplained. The DMN–
aesthetic appreciation link might help to justify it.
Raichle et al. (ref. 6, p. 681) posited that the function of the ﬁrst
region of the DMN, formed by the posterior cingulate cortex and
adjacent precuneus, was to “continuously gather information about
the world around, and possibly within us.” Regarding the second
region of the DMN, the medial prefrontal cortex would reﬂect “a
dynamic interplay between ongoing cognitive processes and the
emotional state of the subject [playing a role] in the integration of
emotional and cognitive processes” (ref. 6, p. 682). Both functional
capacities of the DMN seem adaptive enough to justify its meta-
bolic costs. A different question is that of explaining how this link
between the DMN and aesthetic appreciation appeared or, in
other words, what characteristic of the DMN might lead to the
sudden experiences of a picture’s or a landscape’s beauty.
An added function of the DMN relates it with “mind wan-
dering” processes. Mind wandering refers to images, thoughts,
voices, and feelings that the brain spontaneously produces in the
absence of external stimuli [stimulus-independent thought (SIT)]
(54). This SIT is what we might call the mind talking with itself.
SIT could be a by-product of a general ability to manage
concurrent mental tasks, acquired during human evolution (54).
Nevertheless, Mason et al. (54) offered two possible explanations
for the functional meaning of mind wandering. SIT would enable
subjects to maintain an optimal level of arousal, as well as adding
coherence to one’s past and present experience.
DMN Activation During Executive Tasks. Remembering the past and
imagining the future are processes that activate the DMN (55). In
principle, mental simulations of the future are decoupled from
achieving a particular goal, something that ﬁts well with the fact
that the DMN decreases its activity during attentional or executive
tasks. However, when subjects are presented with imaginary sce-
narios in which they need to solve speciﬁc problems, some coac-
tivity between the DMN and executive regions appears (56). It
Fig. 6. TW2 > TW1 synchronization in beautiful
(Upper) and not beautiful (Lower) conditions.
Fig. 7. Dynamics in the appreciation of beauty.
TW0 networks (illustrated by the TW0 > TW1
comparison) fade during TW1, being substituted by
a similar network shared by beautiful and not
beautiful conditions (illustrated by the TW1 > TW0
comparison under the beautiful condition). During
TW2, not beautiful stimuli activate a bilateral
reorienting network, whereas beautiful stimuli add
the delayed aesthetic network, more medially
placed (in each condition, TW2 networks are illus-
trated by TW2 > TW1 comparison).
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seems that simulating how to solve a problem in the future allows
“task-positive network regions to be coactive with default network
regions without suppressing the contribution of either network”
(ref. 56, p. 1823). To do so, the DMN seems to cover two seem-
ingly contrasting functions: spontaneous cognition and monitoring
the environment. They need not be mutually exclusive, because
they “represent complementary instances of conscious experi-
ences occurring during idle moments of daily life” (ref. 57, p. 76).
There is a growing body of evidence showing the complex rela-
tionships existing between inner thought and the processing
of external events. It shows that traditional dichotomies, such as
on task vs. off task, goal-free vs. goal directed, ormind wandering vs.
mental target are inadequate to describe some processes
of thought.
This seems to be the case of aesthetic appreciation.
Aesthetic appreciation is not an example of stimulus-independent
thinking. Except when recalling past experiences or imaging
objects or places, detecting beauty depends on external stimuli.
However, aesthetic appreciation might be a by-product of the
capacity for mind wandering. Mind wandering is a general, ex-
tended process of perception neither guided by any goal nor
directed to any particular aspect. A close-to-mind-wandering
capacity for assigning beauty or ugliness to visual stimuli could
thus lead to continuous and fast processes of aesthetic ap-
preciation. The combination of EEG and fMRI (58) allows us
to relate the sudden comprehension that accompanies solving
a problem or a perceptual ambiguity—known as the “Aha!
moment”—with the culmination of a series of cognitive events
starting at the resting sate. Regarding aesthetic appreciation, our
current study suggests that the appreciation of beauty might also
be an Aha! moment, the sudden result of a complex process to
which the DMN and other networks contribute.
Aesthetic appreciation processes can be reached even if no
previous purpose to evaluate beauty exists. The human capacity
for aesthetic appreciation could be tentatively described as
something like seeing the world continuously, in a not-oriented
way, with an unconscious capacity for perceiving beauty that can
almost instantaneously become conscious, constituting an Aha!
moment. Everyday life perception of images and the ability to
contemplate objects as likely to be seen as beautiful are different
orientations that can lead to distinct cognitive processes (59).
Nevertheless, we can posit that the Aha! moment also appears
under experimental conditions when stimuli to be judged in aes-
thetic terms are expected to be seen. Natural and experimental
conditions refer to processes that must rest on the same phylo-
genetically ﬁxed cognitive mechanisms of appreciation of beauty,
which include cooperation of the DMN with other perceptual,
decisional, and emotional networks. On the grounds of our results,
the Aha! moment would have a place when the results of aesthetic
appreciation sensu stricto become conscious. If the DMN helps in
this achievement, the Aha! moment might constitute an early
episode during aesthetic appreciation sensu lato, i.e., in TW2. The
ﬁrst consideration that subjects perform, at the beginning of TW2,
could be the awareness of the actual beauty or ugliness of stimuli.
The eventual relationship of this aesthetic Aha! moment with
other episodes, such as that of problem solving, cannot be de-
termined thus far. The cognitive processes related to problem
solving and beauty appreciation seem very different from each
other. Therefore, different brain networks might be implied.
Nevertheless, once again, we need further studies of other Aha!
synchronization dynamics to be able to check their eventual
coincidence against the aesthetic networks identiﬁed by us.
Pathologic Alterations. Aesthetic appreciation compound com-
plexity is supported by pathologic alterations of cognition. The
DMN decreases its resting-state activity in patients with Alz-
heimer’s disease (14, 60, 61). Crucial components of the DMN
are damaged, impairing cognitive tasks related with explicit
memory. Despite this, patients with Alzheimer’s disease are
still able to enjoy the aesthetic qualities of objects and express
their aesthetic preference in a consistent manner, indicated by
highly similar ordering at different moments in time of repre-
sentational, quasi-representational, and abstract picture cards,
according to their preference (62). Halpern et al.’s (62) results
show that patients with Alzheimer’s disease are well aware of
their personal, intrinsic appreciation of beauty and that they
are also able to communicate its content. This fact implies that
such patients (i) appreciate beauty in pictures, (ii) can compare
pictures according to their beauty, and (iii) can order them
consequently. The process affects not only aesthetic apprecia-
tion sensu stricto. Ranking the beauty of each stimulus, com-
paring them all, rating them, and reporting their response form
part of aesthetic appreciation sensu lato and are realized in
a stable manner over time. The capacity for appreciating beauty
despite the impairment of DMN components supports the idea
that aesthetic appreciation is achieved by means of a quite
general coactivity of distinct networks across the brain. Al-
though patients with Alzheimer’s disease would probably have
an altered experience of beauty, they keep enough cognitive
resources to reach the aesthetic appreciation even in advanced
stages of the illness (63).
Comparative Synthesis. Combining the previous results obtained
with our current MEG results, the following panorama appears:
i) A fast aesthetic appreciative perception (aesthetic apprecia-
tion sensu stricto) is formed within the 250- to 750-ms time
window (TW1), activating the initial aesthetic network.
ii) Further cognitive processes—aesthetic appreciation sensu
lato—are subsequently performed within the 1,000- to 1,500-ms
time window (TW2), relying on the delayed aesthetic network.
iii) The initial aesthetic network is involved in both conditions
(beautiful and not beautiful), OFC having an important role
in it.
iv) The delayed aesthetic network is composed of more synchro-
nized links in the beautiful condition. It can be posited that
matching with the DMN occurs only then, during the aesthetic
appreciation sensu lato.
v) Initial and delayed aesthetic networks appear to be clearly
separated in our analysis. However, this might be a result of
the time-windows distribution. Because we have considered
TW0, TW1, and TW2 to be separated by 250-ms time spans,
an eventual gradual transition from the aesthetic apprecia-
tion sensu stricto to the aesthetic appreciation sensu lato
would be hidden by the lack of information corresponding
to the temporal borders. To decide the gradual or abrupt
character of the transition, precisely identifying the Aha! mo-
ment event, more accurate analyses should be carried out.
Hard Problem. The internal but stimulus-dependent visual ap-
preciation of beauty is a subjective experience, what philosophers
call a “quale.” How far have we come in understanding how the
brain produces this mental result?
The soft problem of the mind/brain issue (64), consisting in
our case of the localization of brain areas active when subjects
gauge the beauty of a visual object, has already been clariﬁed
many times under different tasks and experimental conditions.
Combining results of fMRI, MEG, and behavioral studies, we
seem to have begun scratching the surface of the hard problem
(65), i.e., the way in which the experience of beauty could dy-
namically arise from the actions of the brain. This point has
been only partly solved, thus far. It seems that the structure of
the quale, consisting of a description of mental processes, can be
accessed by means of scientiﬁc procedures regarding brain
connectivity and its ﬂow along time. Hopefully, we have offered
some genuine inputs into the dynamics of aesthetic apprecia-
tion. However, for the time being, the content of the quale—i.e.,
the eventual result of beauty, or its absence, as an inner sensation
Cela-Conde et al. PNAS Early Edition | 7 of 8
—is still out of our reach. Many personal circumstances, from
previous experiences to character traits, plus health, age, and
maybe sex, as well as cultural and historical particularities of
each subject and epoch, surely contribute to the Aha! experience
of appreciating beauty.
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